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BRIAN BARRY PRIZE ESSAY 
 
 
Mandatory citizenship for immigrants1 
 
Helder De Schutter (Institute of Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) 
Lea Ypi (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science) 
 
Abstract: Long-term immigrants often have the option but not the obligation to acquire citizenship 
in their state of residence. Contrary to the received wisdom, this article defends the idea of 
mandatory citizenship for immigrants. It suggests that the current asymmetry in the distribution of 
political obligations between native-born citizens and immigrants is unfair. It also argues that 
mandatory citizenship is required by the principle that those who repeatedly affect others should 
share a democratic setting. Finally, it claims that mandatory citizenship is more compatible with the 
ideal of democratic equality and more conducive to a stable society.  
 
1. Political obligation, migration and citizenship 
 
The concept of citizenship is often explored in two distinct but surprisingly isolated areas of 
political theory. The first is the literature on political obligation. Its central question concerns 
what reasons citizens have to obey the laws of particular states and how we might think about 
the practices through which they distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.2 The 
second is the literature on migration, exploring the conditions under which resident immigrants 
could be set on the road to citizenship and what rights and obligations they have in the course of 
doing so.3 The first body of literature, that on political obligation, focuses mostly on the burdens 
of citizenship. It seeks to explain what, if anything, justifies the duty to be a citizen of a particular 
state despite the fact that it may often be costly to do so or that other states might perform better 
in the provision of the same membership goods. The second body of literature, that on migration, 
perceives citizenship mostly as a benefit. It raises the question of the conditions under which one 
might deny such an advantage to resident immigrants or of the arguments we can advance to 
explain how they qualify to claim access to it. 
Here, an interesting asymmetry can be observed. In much of the political obligations 
literature, citizenship is not a matter of choice: the nature of practices through which citizens 
interact with each other means that they cannot easily shed reciprocal associative obligations. In 
the migration literature, the opposite holds true: migrants may or may not be entitled to 
citizenship to begin with, but if they are entitled, the decision to take up the offer to naturalise is 
                                                          
1 We are very grateful to Esma Baycan, Jan Brezger, Joseph Carens, Luara Ferracioli, Bob Goodin, Anthony 
King, Patti Lenard, David Miller, Kieran Oberman, Claus Offe and Avia Pasternak for written comments on 
previous versions of this article. We also thank, for thoughtful discussions, the audiences of the following 
events at which the idea was discussed: Disputationes Triangulae (2011), The Normative Theory of 
Immigration Group (2013), The Political Studies Research Seminar at Ottawa University (2013), De Dag voor 
de Politieke Filosofie (2014), and the Ripple General Seminar (2014). 
2
 Klosko 1999; Rawls 1999; Simmons 2001; Stilz 2009. 
3
 Bauböck 1994; Carens 2013; Miller 2008; Walzer 1983. 
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often considered to be only optional.4 The different way in which citizenship is analysed in these 
debates raises the following question: what if we consider the concept symmetrically? How does 
our understanding of citizenship in the context of migration debates inform our analysis of 
citizenship in the context of defending the political obligations associated to it?  
This question can be further developed in two ways. If we follow the migration literature, 
we will think of citizenship as mostly voluntary-based, and direct our intuitions to interrogate 
widespread assumptions on the grounds of political obligation. On the other hand, if we follow 
the political obligations literature and think about citizenship as a burden to be distributed fairly, 
we will end up questioning our premises on citizenship acquisition and migration. The present 
article is especially concerned with the second question.5 Only at the very end do we sketch out 
some of the implications of this argument for the first. 
Challenging the voluntaristic view of naturalisation in migration debates,6 this article 
defends the idea of mandatory citizenship for long-term immigrants. We argue that citizenship 
acquisition should be legally enforced, much like the obligations of native-born citizens to the 
political communities in which they belong are legally enforced.7 This obligation is addressed at 
different agents: the state has a duty to offer naturalisation (and, more precisely, to impose it as a 
condition of residence), and immigrants, for their part, have a duty to take up citizenship. 
Naturalisation should be granted unconditionally and the immigrant cannot refuse to take up 
citizenship if she wants to stay. For purposes of the argument, it is not essential to distinguish 
between the specific strategies required to make these enforcements effective. The normative 
argument behind all practical proposals would be the same, and it is that argument which 
interests us here.  
Immigrants, we argue, cannot refuse to naturalise, much like native-born citizens cannot 
refuse to be citizens of their states. Of course, it might be objected that citizenship is not 
compulsory for native-born citizens either since they can always choose to emigrate. But exit is a 
costly option and one that few would be prepared to contemplate. Moreover, even if one grants 
that exit is a realistic option, according to current international law only the state of origin is 
compelled to accept citizens into its national territory. Other states may choose to accept but are 
not required to do so. This implies that there remains a problematic asymmetry between citizens 
and immigrants (unless they are refugees) since the former, unlike the latter, have no other 
                                                          
4 Joseph Carens defends the idea of automatic citizenship but restricts it to the children of settled 
immigrants (Carens forthcoming). Our argument in what follows is compatible with his proposal but more 
expansive. 
5 Some might argue that the literature on political obligation is mostly concerned with the obligation to 
obey the law which, as such, applies to both citizens and residents. But this objection neglects the many 
ways in which the law makes specific demands on citizens which it does not on residents, as we go on to 
show in what follows. It also overlooks the fact that the obligation to obey particular laws becomes 
especially burdensome when there is no other option but to do so. 
6 In this literature one proposal that comes close to our own view is that defended in Rubio Marin 2000, 
where the author endorses what she calls “automatic” citizenship as an alternative to optional 
naturalisation theories (for an example of the latter account see Bauböck 1994). Whilst defending the 
automatic acquisition of citizenship at birth, Rubio Marin emphasizes the migrants’ entitlement rather than 
obligation to citizenship and does not focus on the implications of the asymmetry for the question of 
political obligation. Indeed she argues explicitly that her proposal “does not in principle question the 
legitimacy of nation-states’ control over access to membership through traditional means”, (Rubio Marin, 
2000, 38). The point of this article is instead to insist on the symmetrical nature of the question, and 
indeed many of the arguments that Rubio Marin considers objections to the proposal (fairness, democratic 
equality) are cited below as reasons to favour it. 
7 We focus on democratic societies. The arguments we give below also support mandatory citizenship for 
immigrants in other societies, but we don’t specifically deal with the additional issues these raise. 
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community to turn to that would be compelled to accept them, and no in principle enforceable 
claim to membership in any other state. In other words, citizens may well have a right to exit but 
they don’t have a right to enter anywhere other than in the political community they are 
members of.8  
To sum up, we argue that citizenship should be mandatory for all long-term immigrants 
and that the category of long-term non-citizen residents should be abolished.  At the heart of our 
proposal is the idea that no one should lead one’s life as a permanent guest: whoever pursues life 
plans in a country acquires obligations to members of that society that cannot be easily 
suspended. These obligations include sharing the burdens of citizenship (section 3), the duty to 
join those whom one affects in relevant processes of political decision-making, resulting from the 
‘al’-affecting principle’ (section 4), contributing to uphold the democratic equality ideal of 
citizenship (section 5), and ensuring stability and cohesion in society (section 6). The next 
section (section 2) provides further clarification of who is included in the non-citizen resident 
category that is to be abolished, before we lay out the four arguments. The final section considers 
some objections to mandatory citizenship for immigrants. 
 
2. The Status of Non-Citizen Residents 
 
Many millions of people live in countries of which they are not citizens. 30 million inhabitants of 
the European Union, for example, are non-citizen residents. Of this number, almost two thirds 
are citizens of a non EU-country.9 In the United Kingdom, 7 % of the population is not are not 
citizens, amounting to 4,3 million non-citizen residents. Germany has 8 % non-citizen residents, 
Belgium 9,8 %, Spain 12 %, Estonia 16,4 %. Similar figures can be found in the Western 
hemisphere beyond the EU. In the past decade in the United States, every year about one million 
new people received permanent residence status10. Some of these permanent residents will 
eventually become citizens, but the US has approximately 22 million non-citizen residents.11 In 
Norway almost 7% are non-citizen residents. Switzerland has over 20 % non-citizen residents. 
All these numbers suggest that significant segments of the population in western countries are 
not citizens of the country in which they live.12  
The total number of (legal and illegal) international migrants worldwide in 2010 is 
estimated to be 214 million persons, which includes both migrants with foreign citizenship as 
well as foreign-born migrants (of which most but not all have foreign citizenship).13 These 
numbers vary within the countries: cities attract many more migrants. In some cosmopolitan 
cities such as New York, up to 36 % of the population is foreign-born. Twenty-five cities around 
the world have populations consisting of over 25 % foreign-born.14 
                                                          
8
 See also Rubio Marin 2000, 46-7. 
9 On January 2008, EU countries hosted 30.8 million non-citizens, representing 6.2 % of the total EU 
population. Of these 11.3 million were citizens of another Member State (Vasileva 2009). 
10 The US accorded  1,107,126 people permanent residency in 2008; 1,130,818 in 2009; 1,042,625 in 2010; 
1,062,040 in 2011; 1,031,631 in 2012; 990,553 in 2013 (Monger and Yankay 2010; Monger and Yankay 
2014) 
11
 Current Population Survey 2012. 
12
 See OECD 2013. 
13
 World Migration Report 2010. 
14
 Price and Benton-Short 2007. 
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 While many of these residents pay taxes, they are not citizens, and therefore are not 
required to discharge other obligations associated with citizenship. Typically, politicians do not 
have them in mind when addressing the public or drafting policies. They are not generally seen 
as part of the ‘we’ that contributes to create and endorse particular state initiatives. If non-citizen 
residents’ concerns are taken into account, then policies are made for them, but not by them. 
In arguing that all long-term immigrants ought to become citizens, we reason against 
what appears to be a large, but problematic, consensus according to which it is legitimate to have 
fairly large segments of residents who are not citizens in one’s country. For example, in practical 
policy-making, anti-immigration policies often also include making the conditions for citizenship 
acquisition harder. When government leaders such as David Cameron announced publicly 
throughout 2011 that “multiculturalism is dead”, they also called for tougher rules concerning 
citizenship acquisition15. The latter policy implied that it would be more difficult for existing 
residents to gain citizenship – for example by making citizenship tests harder – and thus that the 
category of non-citizen residents would most likely increase as a result of a combination of, on 
the hand, many non-citizen immigrants continuing to live in host countries and new immigrants 
continuing to enter in them. 
When we turn to political theory, matters appear importantly different but with one area 
of overlap. Most normative theorists do not reject the claims of long-term immigrants to be set 
on the road to citizenship. While some defend policies that rule out the acquisition of citizenship 
with regard to particular categories of immigrants, for example temporary worker programs,16 it 
is typically taken for granted that just communities should recognize the right of long-term 
members to become full members of the polity.17 Interestingly however, this right is never 
thought to also be a duty for immigrants: the latter may choose but are not required to become 
citizens.18 In this respect, the consensus about the acceptability of large segments of non-citizens 
among the resident population holds in political philosophy as much as in the backlash against 
multiculturalism which we observe in practical policy-making. 
Our argument differs on precisely this point. We argue that citizenship should be 
mandatory for all immigrants except those involving short-term visit (e.g. tourism, diplomatic 
work, business). On our proposal, only those who can make a credible case to be migrating only 
for the short term might be able to avoid the obligation to take up citizenship. Essentially, then, 
immigrants would be asked to choose one of three options: acquire citizenship, leave the 
country, or prove that the visit is only for the short-term. The exact timeframe after which the 
obligation to take up citizenship should be discharged can be left open, and will depend on 
empirical as well as normative reasons concerning the appropriate baseline for naturalisation. 
For purposes of this article, we leave it open where to place the bar. What matters on the 
proposal defended here is that all long-term immigrants (e.g. those that enter a state on grounds 
of family re-unification, looking for improved job opportunities, or with the intention to settle) 
should be required by law to naturalise.  
Some might wonder whether these claims rely on a problematic assumption of states as 
having unilateral rights to determine who should be allowed to access their territory. Although 
that concern is plausible, we cannot discuss it further here. It is worth emphasising, however, 
that although our argument does not require the abolishment of the category of illegal 
                                                          
15 The Independent, Oct. 11, 2011.  
16
 Stilz 2010. 
17
 See López-Guerra 2005. 
18
 See among many others, Bauböck 1994; Miller 2008. 
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immigrants, extending mandatory citizenship to illegal immigrants is consistent with our 
argument.  
Among legal long-term immigrants, we can further distinguish between temporary legal 
residents, such as guestworkers, and non-temporary or permanent legal residents. The latter 
group has a right to stay indefinitely and includes immigrants who have moved for reasons of 
family re-unification or on socio-economic or political grounds, and it also includes illegal 
immigrants who have been consequently granted legal residence through regularisation 
programmes. All these legal residents live in a country of which they are not citizens. The 
arguments below apply to both temporary and non-temporary legal residents, but we will 
especially focus on permanent legal residents because the argument for mandatory citizenship is 
clearest in their case. The upshot of the argument is a simplification of the categories we 
typically use to distinguish different members of the political community. It leads to the 
disappearance of the category of the non-citizen resident (excepting strictly short-term visitors), 
as illustrated in the table below. The next four sections examine the normative arguments that 
support this proposal. 
 
 Citizen Non-Citizen 
Resident X TO BE ABOLISHED 




3. The fair distribution of the burdens of citizenship 
  
The first argument in support of mandatory citizenship for immigrants insists on the relevance 
of fairness in the equal distribution of the burdens of citizenship. Although many migration 
scholars have emphasized the advantages of being a citizen, they have usually paid little 
attention to the burdens it carries with it. Citizenship is a burden because it places fellow 
members of a political community in an associative scheme that requires them to think and act 
together to advance a political system designed to support their life in common.  Of course, 
depending on the category, many immigrants, especially if they are permanent residents, already 
carry some civic duties: they obey the law, they pay taxes, they make a productive contribution 
to the economy, they share the burdens of social life in common. However, when it comes to the 
political aspects of citizenship, migrants are excluded from sharing the burdens of citizenship. 
These demands of citizenship are upheld by both legal sanctions and informal expectations, 
which we discuss in turn.  
Consider the paradigmatically burdensome case of forced conscription. Citizenship 
entails an obligation on the side of citizens to support and defend a particular country should a 
war threaten its peaceful existence. In many cases the state can act coercively to draft subsets of 
its citizenry (typically younger, healthy males) into the military, asking them to make significant 
personal sacrifices, leave their families, suspend their normal daily activities and be prepared to 
join their fellow-citizens in offering support for the governments. It affects not only younger men 
but also their parents or wives and children, who are financially and emotionally affected by 
their absence and possible death.  
Of course, there are many plausible cases of conscientious objection to unjust wars, and 
these should be given due weight. And of course, given the nature of contemporary warfare, the 
burden of citizenship may in this case never be actually imposed. But even with these 
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qualifications, it seems unfair to impose such burdens on native citizens alone and leave out 
residents who did not choose to take up citizenship. If citizens had a choice, they might also 
prefer to renounce their citizenship rather than being coercively involved in a military 
enterprise. As a matter of history, the fair distribution of the burdens of membership is at the 
root of important decisions about naturalisation. As the case of France in 1889 illustrates, the 
decision to shift from jus sanguinis to jus soli resulted largely from demographic shifts and a 
decline in birth-rates which meant that the burdens of war and the need for manpower could no 
longer be sustained by native citizens alone and had to include the children of immigrants.19  
Forced conscription is only one extreme case illustrating the burdens of citizenship. 
Whatever one makes of it, there are also many other kinds of political obligation that distinguish 
between citizens and residents. Think for example about the duty to serve on juries, and the 
epistemic as well as practical costs involved in it. It is precisely the burden that jury duty entails 
that was at the heart of Californian Assembly Member Bob Wieckowski’s argument that 
immigrants should perform such service: “They benefit from the protections of our laws, so it is 
fair and just that they be asked to share in the obligation to do jury duty”.20 Think also about 
mandatory voting, where it exists and is enforced: in states like Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, 
Brazil, or Singapore, citizens have to present themselves on election day at the voting booth. 
Voting is a legal obligation in a quarter of all democracies.21 In addition, in many states voting 
booth assistants or polling officers are selected among the population and have the obligation to 
stay until votes are counted. Another example is that of tax rules that apply to all citizens where 
immigrants can claim temporary tax exemptions.  
But there are also informal duties and expectations that bring burdens for citizens. Think 
about the expectation to reflect on and justify or criticise the actions of one’s fellow-citizens both 
outside and inside one’s native country. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, many Germans 
visiting Greece felt pressured by their Greek hosts to explain and justify the actions of their 
government, to support or apologise important political decisions being made. The same applied 
to many Americans during W. G. Bush administration years, where a number of protesters joined 
anti-war campaigns with slogans saying “Not in my name” to signal their distancing from their 
countries’ problematic foreign policy. Another important dimension are attitudes concerning the 
past: a few years ago, Nicolas Sarkozy, himself a second generation Hungarian immigrant in 
France and then president of the French republic apologised to Algerians for the injustice and 
suffering caused by the French during their recent colonial relation. Some might argue that such 
feelings of guilt, shame or responsibility are unrelated to the colour of one’s passport, and that 
attitudes to certain political communities would remain the same regardless of whether one is 
fully included in their franchise. But this argument ignores the fact that non-citizens can 
successfully shed outside criticism or daunting shame by stressing the fact that they are not 
citizens, that policies simply have not been concocted in their name. Moreover, it undermines the 
symbolic and expressive value of citizenship. It overlooks the difference that it makes in 
                                                          
19
 Weil 2002. 
20 The New York Times, 22 September 2013. With this argument, Wieckowski supported a Californian Bill 
to extend jury membership to permanent legal residents. The Bill was later rejected by Governor Jerry 
Brown. To be clear, our proposal is distinct from that of the Bill: in our view, the fair distribution of the 
burdens of citizenship requires that non-citizens become citizens, not that non-citizens stay non-citizens 
and perform (some of the) duties traditionally associated with citizenship. In section 7 of this article we 
discuss the distinction between requiring non-citizens to become citizens and requiring them to carry out 
some extra duties as non-citizens. 
21
 Birch 2009, 1. 
 7 
criticising or endorsing certain policies to have voted in favour or against them and to have had a 
chance to participate in the official processes leading to their endorsement.  
Other informal duties include the duty to pay attention to political affairs so as to be able 
to responsibly and knowledgeably cast a vote and select among different principled political 
alternatives. 22 Even in states where voting is not a legal obligation or where such an obligation is 
not enforced, social and political pressures to vote might be exercised in one’s career or through 
alternative systems of benefits or social sanctions.23 And even abstracting from social benefits or 
sanctions, there is a general belief in society that people ought to vote so as to take responsibility 
for political outcomes. Jason Brennan calls this the ‘folk theory of voting ethics’ arguing that it 
includes the idea that “[e]ach citizen has a civic duty to vote. In extenuating circumstances, one 
can be excused from voting, but otherwise, one should vote”.24  
We emphasise here the burdens rather than benefits of citizenship not to undermine the 
importance of the latter but because the relation between the two is one of mutual consolidation. 
It would be difficult for members of a particular political association to enjoy the advantages of 
citizenship (living in a liberal-democratic setting, sharing a socio-economic redistribution 
scheme, enjoying the public goods available in the territory) without these collective burdens. 
Preserving public goods needs political management. And the latter is in turn difficult without a 
collective “we” that is required to mobilise politically in order to uphold common institutions. 
One cannot enjoy a redistributive scheme without managing it, electing people to formulate 
particular political goals and deliberating about such proposed alternatives: all these are 
essential individual and collective preconditions of civic justice and freedom. But while the 
benefits of living as part of a collective association often extend to permanent residents, many 
extra-burdens are in principle only carried by citizens. In all the cases emphasized above, the 
formal and informal burdens of citizenship – serving on juries, voting, shouldering outsiders’ 
criticisms, being ready to apologise regarding the nation’s past deeds, serving in the army when 
one’s country is under attack, serving as a polling officer,– are exercised by citizens. Yet they 
generate benefits from which non-citizen residents cannot be excluded: the burdens of 
citizenship benefit all residents but are carried out only by those residents who are citizens. To 
remedy this condition, all those enjoying the benefits should also contribute to their production. 
Of course, all this is compatible with arguing that in different states the burdens of 
citizenship will be differentiated. In some political circumstances these might be weightier than 
in others, and the case in favour of mandatory citizenship would likely be stronger.25 But the 
general point we are trying to make is one of fairness in the distribution of whatever burdens 
there are, assuming that even in the more minimal cases a certain degree of political involvement 
by citizens is necessary to the production of public benefits. And here the asymmetry between 
citizens and long-term residents is remarkable. Non-citizen residents are never required to think 
about the future of host countries as their countries. They are, and are offered no reason not to 
behave like, permanent guests. This seems to conflict with our intuitions about fairness and the 
way in which participants in an associative scheme are required to do their share in upholding 
that association. If we focus on the burdens of citizenship, residents who are not required to take 
up citizenship are effectively like free riders. Of course they are often freeriding against their 
own will, since many want to become citizens. The point we are making however applies 
generally, whether one ends up being a permanent resident out of choice or out of necessity. 
                                                          
22 We are grateful to Bob Goodin for suggesting this further argument. 
23
 Birch 1999, 4. 
24
 Brennan 2012, 3. 
25 We are grateful to Anthony King for raising this objection. 
 8 
Fairness requires that we share the burdens of citizenship among all those who take advantage 
of cooperative life in a particular association. Failing that, some will end up doing more than they 
ought to be required to do than others. When that is the case, the whole system supporting such 
division between those who comply and those who fail to do so, is likely to be perceived as 
unfair.  
 
4. The All-Affecting Principle 
 
A second argument in favour of mandatory citizenship relates to the issue of taking political 
responsibility for what has an impact on others’ public life. If agents affect one-another (for 
example by making use of the publicly provided education system, by walking one’s dog in the 
park or by organizing noisy parties), they should be willing to be part of a democratic process 
where they explain their practices and discuss possible demands for compensation or change. 
Call this the “all-affecting” principle (AIF). The principle can be formulated as follows: “all those 
who repeatedly (significantly26) affect others, have a duty to participate in a democratic process 
in which justifications for particular courses of action are advanced.” The idea behind the 
principle is that one cannot constantly perform actions which exert influence on others or make 
use of common spaces without being prepared to join the civic political fora where practices that 
affect others are discussed and negotiated.  
To understand this point, consider the following example. Imagine a city borough where 
most of the Muslims are non-citizens. If the Muslims want the mosque’s minaret to call Muslims 
to prayer several times a day in an area where many non-Muslims citizens live, then the Muslims 
must be prepared to discuss potential grievances surrounding the minaret’s ‘noise’ with non-
Muslim inhabitants. It is not enough that the citizens have a democratic place to do this by 
themselves (say the municipal council), where they could decide to ban the mosque or to forbid 
loud calls for prayer: the principle states that the Muslims ought to be prepared to discuss the 
issue. Of course it is also in the interest of the Muslims to participate in the discussions leading to 
such decisions. But the all-affecting principle argues that, even if the Muslims preferred not to 
participate, the non-Muslims would have a right that the Muslims engage with them and justify 
the reasons behind their claims.27 
There are two main arguments in support of this principle. The first is that the political 
inclusion of Muslims gives non-Muslims an opportunity to hear the reasons behind the Muslims’ 
claims and thus to better understand their concerns. The non-Muslims have an interest in the 
Muslims’ participation because only then can they ensure that the decisions taken somehow 
strike a chord with the Muslims, or that they fall within the realm of decisions that can possibly 
be adhered to. Without the Muslims’ take they might make decisions that deeply offend the 
Muslims or entirely ignore their concerns with the result that Muslims might then seek to ways 
to avoid such decisions, circumvent potential sanctions or openly resist them. This leads to a lack 
                                                          
26 Most defenders of the principle affirm that not every type of being affected counts; one should in some 
way be relevantly or significantly affected (for example, Cavallero 2010). We sideline this discussion here, 
and think we are justified in doing so, for it is clear that sharing the same welfare system, educational 
services, roads, parks, schools and theatres is going to meet the relevance or significance threshold. (This 
still does not require non-citizens to justify all their actions, only those that ‘relevantly’ or ‘significantly’ 
affect others. But we don’t need to establish the precise cut-off point; what matters is that a democratic 
forum uniting all the inhabitants as citizens exists in different political communities and requires each 
member of it to participate.)  
27 On the importance of the right and duty to justification for a democratic community more broadly see 
Forst 2013. 
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of understanding and tensions in the community, contributing to policies that are indirectly 
more burdensome to citizens than they would be if they had resulted from a collective process of 
decision-making.  
The second argument for the all-affecting principle is that it may induce the Muslims to 
assume a more collective viewpoint on matters of common interest.  It is therefore in the interest 
of the non-Muslims to be able to explain to the Muslims what the non-Muslim concerns are, so 
that the Muslims may adopt certain practices to accommodate the concerns, or have some sense 
of which practices are more objectionable from the non-Muslim point of view. Again, here, the 
burdens of citizenship are distributed more responsibly, if the policies that affect citizens 
collectively are also collectively made from a point of view that is general rather than particualr.  
This all-affecting principle can be distinguished from the “all-affected principle” (AF), 
often put forward in the literature on transnational or global democracy. The all-affected 
principle states that whoever is affected by a public decision should have a right to inclusion in 
the democratic process that produces that decision. The argument is deployed in the current 
literature on global democracy to justify the expansion of democracy beyond national 
boundaries, on the face of empirical evidence on the impact of decisions made within particular 
borders on the lives of those who are not subject to that state’s jurisdiction. But here we are 
interested in arguing that the citizens have a rightful requirement to the participation of non-
citizen residents resulting from the fact that the latter affect the former (e.g. by sounding the 
minaret). AF is in this case already satisfied: the affected (the citizens) already have a right to 
inclusion in the democratic process that makes the decision: in fact, they are the only ones that 
are included in that process. AIF, on the other hand, puts forward the idea that it is important 
that agents who affect others are prepared to join them in publicly justifying their actions 
through appropriate political institutions and channels of collective decision-making. This may 
help those who are affected in understanding better the motivations of those that affect them, 
but it may also encourage the latter to see their concerns and revise their actions accordingly. 
Both may gain from this conversation and from the mechanisms of representative or deliberative 
participation conducive to it.  
Another important difference is that AIF is a principle focused on obligations, whereas AF 
is a principle focused on entitlements. From the point of view of AF, it is enough that the affected 
can participate, even if they end up choosing not to get involved. In contrast, the AIF requires the 
affecting party to interact and justify its actions. Those who affect others cannot choose not to 
participate: their inclusion is necessary to fulfil the double function of listing their concerns and 
listening to the affected’s concerns. Because of these two reasons, democracy involves more than 
giving the affected decision-making power; it requires those who affect and those who are 
affected to participate together in making certain decisions. With AIF we therefore place our 
emphasis on individual relations and the role these have in the life of a political community. This 
generates a demand for the democratic politicisation of these relations which emphasizes that 
agents who affect each other should also share a space for exchanging reciprocal reasons, 
presenting their concerns and justifying decisions. Only then will we be able to say that a shared 
political life is collectively endorsed. 
 
 
5. Strengthening Democratic Equality 
 
One of the most important reasons that are often cited for offering citizenship to immigrant 
residents relates to the risks of maintaining a system of laws that distinguishes between two 
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categories of subjects: citizens who enjoy the benefits and share the burdens of citizenship and 
foreigners who are excluded from it. Abandoning the expectation that immigrants should be fully 
incorporated in host societies implies endorsing an ideal of denizenship that destabilizes the 
logic of democratic inclusion on which many countries of immigration rely.28 If we accept that 
laws should not discriminate on grounds of race, gender or social class, we should also be 
prepared to accept that introducing different standards for citizens and immigrants corrupts the 
democratic ethos of host societies. It implicitly legitimizes laws that do not treat everyone as an 
equal and threatens to absolve the apartheid-like condition of those who are not offered an equal 
say in the making of laws to which they are subjected. 
A similar argument has often been made to draw attention on the vulnerability of 
immigrants admitted through temporary worker programmes: the case of Turkish guestworkers 
in Germany during the Seventies and Eighties is here the paradigmatic case. Many authors have 
claimed that to avoid the creation of ‘live-in servants’, working under a tyranny of ‘citizen-
tyrants’,29 long-term immigrants must be set on the road to citizenship. If host societies allow 
immigrants to reside in their territories, then they must also offer them naturalization. Walzer 
argues that “as soon as some residents are citizens in fact, all must be so. No democratic state can 
tolerate the establishment of a fixed status between citizen and foreigner”.30 Indeed, immigrants 
should be equals in a world of shared obligations and “must be prepared to share the 
obligations”.31  
However, even in such cases the ensuing prescription never takes the form of an 
obligation for immigrants. Immigrants are allowed to become citizens; they are never required to 
do so. On this account, immigrants have a right, but not a duty, to naturalise. “They may choose 
not to become citizens, to return home or stay on as resident aliens. Many – perhaps most – will 
choose to return because of their emotional ties to their national family and their native land. But 
unless they have that choice, their other choices cannot be taken as so many signs of their 
acquiescence to the economy and law of the countries where they work”.32  This argument 
therefore justifies the right (not duty) to citizenship based on the needs of the individual 
migrants within a democratic setting: since they are subject to the laws of host societies, as 
democrats we ought to recognise their right to political equality and to enjoying the benefits of 
citizenship. To endorse the alternative is to implicitly absolve the apartheid-like condition in 
which many non-citizen migrants live.  
This argument however misses an important point. We need to distinguish between the 
interests of immigrants to be fully enfranchised in host-societies and a more general interest of 
everyone to live under political institutions that reflect an appropriate democratic ideal of 
equality. Making citizenship acquisition voluntary ensures that immigrant interests are taken 
into account and leaves it to them to decide what the best form of promoting such interests is. Of 
the 900.000 immigrants that were qualified to naturalise in Switzerland in 2010, only 36.000 
actually did so in 2011. When asked why, many long-term immigrants argued that it was not in 
their interest. “Neither of us are interested in becoming Swiss”, a British-Canadian couple is 
reported to have said to Swiss journalists. “We don’t understand anyone’s motivation, if their 
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 Walzer 1983, 272-280; Miller 2008, 377. 
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 Walzer 1983. 
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 Walzer 1983, 60. 
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 Walzer 1983, 58-59. 
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 Walzer 1983, 60. 
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current citizenship is of a well-recognised and respected country.”33 But in this case, and if the 
acquisition of citizenship is left to contingent and (potentially) self-serving decisions made by 
immigrant residents, it may do very little to promote democratic equality in the institutions of 
the host-society. 
To see this point, consider the analogy with slavery. Slavery is wrong both because it 
conflicts with the interests of slaves and because it is an unjust institution. A just society is one 
free of slaves. Endorsing the institutional discrimination between those who are born free and 
those who are not corrupts this ethos of inclusion and equality. In most cases, since slavery is 
against the interests of slaves, the normal expectation is that offering slaves the choice of exiting 
their condition also contributes to the end of slavery as an unjust practice. But that connection is 
contingent: suppose some slaves have nice masters. Suppose life as a slave is easier than 
undertaking paid work. In such cases it is reasonable to expect that slaves will not take the offer 
of exiting their condition; the institution of slavery will remain unthreatened. What we need in 
such cases is to abolish the category of slaves by making it compulsory to put an end to that 
condition. In a similar way, if we are worried by the existence of apartheid-like institutions that 
discriminate between citizens and denizens, the solution is not to offer denizens the option of 
taking up citizenship. It is to make the acquisition of citizenship compulsory.  
In fact, Walzer’s own argument already logically leads to this view. The principle on 
which Walzer relies unavoidably leads to a more drastic conclusion that the one he draws. The 
argument rests on a conception of political community in which all live in a world of ‘shared 
obligations’. If immigrants ‘must be prepared to share the obligations’ and if we cannot ‘tolerate 
the establishment of a fixed status between citizen and foreigner’34 within a society, then it 
would be inconsistent to allow immigrants to opt out of obligations of citizenship, and continue 
to behave as foreigners. Walzer’s conclusion – the right to citizenship – follows from his premise 
– no permission to opt out of citizenship obligations and no fixed status difference.  
One might argue at this point that distinguishing between the interest of migrants in 
citizenship and the compulsory nature of citizenship argument is pointless since, Swiss 
exceptionalism aside, it may be difficult in practice to imagine resident migrants who are not 
interested in taking up citizenship. But this is not quite accurate. As one author puts it, it should 
give us pause for thought that even in the paradigmatic example of denizenship, that of Turkish 
guestworkers in Germany, “just over a third of Turks in Germany have actually adopted German 
citizenship, and that the number of Turks who have chosen to make use of the legal entitlement 
to do so declined from 83.000 in 2000 to just 25.000 in 2009”.35 In many European cases, 
although residents are sometimes excluded from the full range of socio-economic rights, such 
exclusion is contingent upon the duration of residence rather than admission to citizenship. And 
although they cannot vote in national elections, they can vote in local ones on the issues that 
most closely affect them. Moreover, apart from employment in public sector offices, most other 
positions remain open to them. What all this means is that “migrants who are not particularly 
interested in the politics of their country of residence, are not poor, earn a living in the private 
sector, and do not intend to relocate within the EU have at best very limited interest-related 
                                                          
33See Jeannie Wurz, “ Naturalisation? No thanks. Why some residents choose not to become Swiss’, Swiss 
Info, April 29, 2013, 
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reasons to naturalize”.36 Of course, one might argue here that the reasons why many Turkish 
immigrants choose not to naturalise are related to the importance for them of maintaining 
continuous links with their country of origin which, in the absence of dual citizenship, would be 
seriously undermined. Yet even if this were true it would introduce a different form of 
unfairness, allowing those that could afford not to take up citizenship to free ride on its burdens, 
compared to those who have no other choice. Yet, as the previous pages tried to show there 
seems to be something wrong in making the promotion of the democratic ideal of equality 
dependent upon the contingent interests of immigrants, just as it is wrong to make the abolition 
of the practice of slavery contingent on the existence of benign slaveholders. The fact that some 
states (like Australia) require their citizens living abroad to pay taxes is usually not a sufficient 
reason for citizens of such countries to be able to claim tax exemptions in the host state. 
Likewise, the fact that some states make it more difficult for emigrants and/or immigrants to 
have dual citizenship cannot suffice by itself to excuse immigrants from the acquisition of 
citizenship in receiving states .37 
 
 
6. Stability and cohesion 
 
The offer of citizenship to immigrants has also been defended on grounds of its contribution to 
the promotion of stability and cohesion of host societies, compatibly with a liberal ideal of 
nationalism that remains open to people from different cultural backgrounds and seeks to 
integrate them in the on-going projects and commitments of existing members of the nation. In 
fact, what allegedly distinguishes liberal nationalism from illiberal nationalism is precisely its 
endeavour to allow for the inclusion of members of other national cultures to join the political 
projects and democratic activities of the host nation. This implies “relatively easy access to 
citizenship after, say, three to five years of residency, with minimal tests of national integration, 
including knowledge of the national language, knowledge of national history and institutions, 
and an oath of loyalty to the country and its constitution”.38 So this liberal conception of 
nationhood is ‘thin’: it does not include shared conceptions of the good life, or shared blood lines 
as conditions for national citizenship. At the same time, however, it still asks new citizens to 
speak the national language, to share the national identity and to feel loyalty and commitment 
towards the new nation and its desire for self-government.39 
 What motivates this openness to members of different cultural groups is an 
understanding of liberal national projects as pluralistic and inclusive. Kymlicka, one of the most 
forceful advocates of this idea, is sceptical of ‘post-national’ conceptions of citizenship where 
local voting rights are decoupled from citizenship and granted to immigrants. Instead, a 
“politically progressive defence of local voting rights for aliens must view it as a proto-
citizenship right; that is, as a form of political socialization into the national political system, 
enabling immigrants to develop bonds of trust and attachment towards national institutions, and 
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37 We think that the case for mandatory citizenship can be made without arguing for or against dual 
citizenship. But it goes without saying that those who combine that case with dual citizenship will have an 
easier task convincing immigrants to take up citizenship. We return to this issue in the fifth objection 
below. 
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hence as a step towards full national citizenship”.40 This argument rejects unbundling rights from 
national citizenship: if local voting rights are implemented, they must be seen as transitional, as a 
step towards full citizenship.  
This move is advantageous to immigrants who must be enabled (in our case: 
constrained) to become full members of the host society. But it is also advantageous to the host 
community. The full integration of immigrants in the national political sphere through the 
extension of citizenship promotes cohesion in the host society and contributes to its stability. 
Residents who become citizens have more incentives to take responsibility for shared collective 
projects: they now belong to the new community as full members of it, and fewer lines of 
contrast between “us and them” can be drawn. This promotes the integration of particular 
cultural groups and discourages the ossification of practices that undermine the common 
political good. 
 What this clearly shows is that the promotion of cohesion and stability in receiving 
societies gives us reasons to favour citizenship duties for resident non-citizens, also 
independently from the interests of members of such groups to acquire citizenship. If removing 
the formal boundary dividing citizens and residents turns out to strengthen joint cooperative 
activities in the context of a more stable society, moves in that direction should not only be 
welcomed and applauded but actively supported. Mandatory citizenship is the most plausible 
way to enable that support because the alternative to mandatory citizenship is the existence of a 
category of non-citizen residents, hampering cohesion and stability. 
 
7. Some objections 
 
One might object at this point that mandatory citizenship is an illiberal proposal. One cannot 
force immigrants to take citizenship against their will since this would compromise their 
autonomy in the host society. But there are several ways to answer this critique. First, if we take 
the political obligations literature seriously, it is important to understand that citizenship is not a 
matter of preference, to be pursued or rejected. It is a shared project. In so far as one is part of 
the political community where other citizens live, and those existing citizens share the 
responsibilities of citizenship, it would be wrong to allow resident non-citizens to refuse to do so. 
After all, native-born citizens do not choose where they have come to live, and exit-options are 
often costly. If anything, immigrant residents are at an advantage here, they have chosen to 
emigrate from their own countries and they can also opt to go back. But if they choose to stay, it 
is only fair that they share the burdens of citizenship in the same way native born citizens do. 
 It is also possible to temper the objection by pointing out that residents often undertake 
a number of obligations in the host-society, not all of which are chosen. We do not typically think 
it is illiberal to ask them to contribute to the social security system for example. We think these 
obligations are important to avoid free-riding problems, and to ensure that everyone who enjoys 
the benefits of being a member of a political community does his or her share. If that is the case, 
the difference between the obligations of residence (such as contributions to the social security 
system) that immigrants already undertake and the more demanding obligations of citizenship is 
only of degree rather than kind.  
 Notice also that even if we grant that the objection has force, the issue of fairness 
towards existing citizens remains. Consider for example the distinction between the obligation to 
vote, which is backed up by sanctions in a number of countries, including Belgium and Australia, 
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and local voting rights for immigrants. In many countries non-citizen residents can vote in local 
elections but are not obliged to do so. This raises the issue of fairness in the distribution of 
demands for political participation in countries with compulsory voting: citizens have the legal 
duty to vote in local elections but immigrants have a choice. Citizens have reasonable grounds for 
complaint here: why should they be obliged to vote, whereas others, who equally spend their 
lives ‘here’, only have the option? To make the acquisition of citizenship obligations voluntary for 
migrants would be to discriminate unfairly towards them. 
 A second objection to our proposal is that even though it may be reasonable to ask non-
citizen residents to share the burdens of cooperative life in a political community, there are other 
ways to take up that obligation that do not involve the imposition of citizenship. We could for 
instance cancel tax exemptions for immigrants, require them to perform jury services, or even 
conscript them in times of war41. This objection is plausible. Yet several counter-arguments can 
be given to show why it is a less desirable solution than mandatory citizenship. Firstly, if the 
points about democratic equality and cohesion are correct, the inequality of status between 
citizens and long-term residents implies that nothing short of citizenship would restore the 
democratic ethos in a community since citizens would still be asked to perform duties that 
residents would be exempted from. For example, from a symbolic and expressive perspective, 
important differences would remain. But even more pertinently, we may wonder whether we 
would not strip down the notion of citizenship as commonly understood if we asked immigrants 
to perform all of the tasks normally understood to belong to citizenship, without calling them 
citizens. What we do when we require the residents to carry out the burdens of citizenship 
through means other than citizenship is to effectively grant them citizenship without calling it so. 
If we ask immigrants to perform all the duties associated with citizenship, then aren’t we 
effectively making them citizens? If we require them to be drafted in times of war, to join 
democratic deliberations about the future of the city park or the minaret, to vote in national 
elections and so on, what grounds would there remain to distinguish between them and what we 
ordinarily call citizens? 
 A third objection states that not granting citizenship to immigrants is not unfair, for the 
following reason. Of course, the critic concedes, there are duties to citizenship. But citizenship 
also brings many benefits, such as the right to stay indefinitely in a host community one has 
chosen.  But this objection misunderstands the nature of our argument. The claim made here is 
not that being denied access to citizenship is unfair for immigrants, though that may also be true. 
The point is that long-term residence without citizenship is unfair to citizens, who lack 
appropriate political fora for democratic confrontation (satisfying the all-affecting principle) , 
and live in a society that is less stable and cohesive than it could be given the presence of 
significant groups of non-citizens in their midst. Even more importantly, the danger of 
uncoupling the right to stay from the obligation to acquire citizenship is that it creates a two-
tiered system of obligations and entitlements, one for citizens and one for residents, which 
undermines the democratic ethos of a society of equals, as we discussed in section 5. Hence, the 
last three of our four arguments requires full mandatory citizenship. How about the first 
argument, about the fair distribution burdens of citizenship? That argument states that the 
burdens of citizenship benefit all residents but are currently only borne by citizens, and sees 
citizenship for all as the solution. This is very clear in the case of permanent residents. Take for 
instance so called ‘second country nationals’, EU citizens who live in a European country other 
                                                          
41 In the US, in addition to male citizens, also male non-citizen residents between the ages of 18 and 25 are 
required to register with the Selective Service System and keep it updated regarding their place of 
residence, so that in times of war these men could in principle be called upon. See www.sss.gov.  
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than the one they were born in. They are very well protected up to the point where the only 
meaningful distinction between them and citizens is the lack of burdens that second country 
nationals experience. But the argument is less clear for non-permanent residents: they can only 
stay as long as their visa allows them to, for them citizenship is not a burden-equalizer since 
citizenship also gives them access to the crucial benefit of enjoying the right to stay indefinitely, 
something craved by many immigrants. They forego the burdens of citizenship but also one 
major benefit. Since they do not share all the benefits of citizenship, not asking them to become 
citizens is not unjust towards citizens. To the citizen who says: it’s unfair that you are not 
prepared to be a citizen (without the right to stay), they can reply: “It’s not unfair since although 
I don’t shoulder your burdens, I also don’t enjoy all the benefits of citizenship.” It may well be 
then that the burden sharing argument is limited to long-term immigrants for whom access to 
citizenship either is or will be offered in the future. 
 A fourth objection to the proposal we have introduced might be to say that mandatory 
citizenship would come at a certain cost for the community of the receiving state since 
naturalisation would actually threaten the cohesion of an existing historical collective. This 
objection points to the tension between two requirements for viable democracy: a) a viable 
democracy needs a shared language and shared cultural practices, versus b) a viable democracy 
requires the inclusion of all those who are subject to the laws of a particular territory. A 
straightforward response to that objection might be to say that, of course, there are 
circumstances in which the latter option might override the former. But there is no need to 
defend mandatory citizenship in this more demanding way. The point to emphasize instead is 
that the costs of cohesion would be the same or higher if citizenship was not mandatory and 
many non-citizens continued to be residents. Even limiting our understanding of what 
democracy requires to the first option, mandatory citizenship is not worse than its alternative, 
because the alternative to mandatory citizenship is not to have no linguistic or cultural others; 
the alternative is having a group of non-citizen linguistic or cultural others. This is often forgotten 
by those who insist on tougher citizenship acquisition rules: the result of such rules is not the 
absence of immigrants but the greater presence of non-citizen immigrants. Given this actual 
presence of non-citizen residents in the territory, the lack of commonality will be a concern with 
or without mandatory citizenship. The degree of integration of recently naturalised citizens will 
depend on the measures a state adopts to ensure that all citizens are integrated in the system of 
laws and practices of their new community. If anything, it is plausible to suppose that full 
political inclusion in the polity might increase cohesion rather than the other way round. 
 Yet another objection to this proposal might be to raise the issue of the increase in 
political power commanded by naturalised citizens who retain membership in their country of 
origin.42 Wouldn’t it be unfair, some might ask, to give more votes in different countries to 
citizens who would as a result have more influence over political institutions than others who 
are only citizens of one country? To answer this objection we must remember that the proposal 
of mandatory citizenship does not commit us to a specific response to the question of dual, triple 
or multiple citizenship. To say that it is justified to impose citizenship on immigrant residents, 
does not commit us to either accepting that host countries are entitled to ask immigrants to 
renounce citizenship in their countries of origin (as the Netherlands require immigrants to do, as 
a condition of citizenship) or that immigrants are entitled to retain it. Some would argue that 
multiple citizenship would not pose such a threat to democracy given the fact that citizens 
inevitably have differential influence over political institutions: one vote from an American 
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might, in practice, be much more weighty than three votes of a Guatemalan, for example. But 
others would argue that these empirical trends are concerning, and we should intervene to 
change them as much as possible. In such cases, rotating citizenship so as to allow for 
membership in only one political community at a time would not be a far-fetched solution. It 
would effectively imply giving up on the standard idea that citizenship captures a permanent 
status, and making the rules of citizenship flexible for everyone, thus connecting citizenship to 
residence much more tightly and accepting that there may be time-limits on how long one is a 
member of a political community for. When one becomes a citizen of a country, for example, 
one’s original citizenship might become dormant until taken up again by moving back, provided 
some conditions are attached to make fiscal free-riding impossible. All of the solutions raise 
additional questions to the ones we are confronting in this article, and mandatory citizenship is 
open to many different answers so long as we think consistently about them. 
A sixth objection might be to insist on the symbolic importance of citizenship for native-
born citizens who might feel more attached to the institutions of the host society than newly 
arrived immigrants are. Such native citizens might be hostile to the idea of making citizenship 
compulsory for everyone since for them it might imply renouncing the unique bond between 
them and the historical community that they feel attached to. As already emphasized when 
discussing the stability and cohesion arguments of the previous section, this question is partly an 
empirical one so cannot be settled conclusively here. But we can limit ourselves to the following 
response: citizens who feel strongly the symbolic attachment to their citizenship may be wrong 
to think about it in exclusionary terms. If that is the case, the objection can be progressively 
defeated if policies to integrate immigrants and to educate them to an ideal of inclusive national 
citizenship are in place. The argument we have presented offers a powerful tool to politicians 
and policy-makers prepared to support that case, since it presses an ideal of citizenship as a 
status that comes with burdens as well as benefits, and asks domestic publics to think about the 
need to share such burden equally with all immigrants. Once this correction to the ideal of 
citizenship is made, those defending its symbolic importance should be much more amenable to 
being persuaded about its mandatory nature.  
  
8. Conclusion  
 
The argument of this article has been that citizenship should be mandatory for all resident 
immigrants. If we take seriously the literature on political obligation concerning the burdens of 
citizenship and the need for fellow-citizens to share such burdens on a fair basis of political 
cooperation, the same burden-sharing, we argue, ought to apply to immigrants. Since citizens 
have no option but to accept and share the burdens of citizenship, immigrants should be part of 
the same scheme of cooperation and share those very same burdens equally.  
Our case in favour of mandatory citizenship was made by presenting arguments based on 
fairness, the all-affecting principle, democratic inclusion and cohesion. At the heart of our 
concern was the need for symmetry between our intuitions on political obligation and those on 
migration. If citizenship involves burdensome duties, then migrants should shoulder these too. 
As mentioned at the outset, it is also possible to pursue a different line of argument and insist 
that since citizenship is voluntary for immigrants, it should also be voluntary for citizens. While 
this would not alter the demandingness of citizenship obligations, it would allow for the choice of 
the particular place where the demanding obligations are to be fulfilled.43 This would support 
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actual consent theories of political obligation rather than the alternative (fairness or reciprocity) 
accounts to which we implicitly appealed in the previous pages. Since exploring further the 
implications of this argument would take us too far from the contents of the present analysis, we 
hope to pursue that question in a different article. 
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